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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ST. LAWRENCE COUNTY, 
Respondent, 
-and-
#2A-6/30/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2529 
ST. LAWRENCE COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
The charge herein was filed by the St. Lawrence County Chapter of the 
Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) on February 4, 1977. It alleges 
that St. Lawrence County (County) committed an improper practice in violation 
of §209-a.l of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in that it 
unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of employment of employees in the 
unit represented by CSEA. The alleged unilateral change relates to the health 
insurance program that covers unit employees. 
The parties entered into a stipulation on May 11, 1977 which, among 
other things, requested that the charge be processed under §204.4 of our Rules. 
This procedure, which is applicable to disputes primarily involving a disagree-
ment as to the scope of negotiations under the Act, dispenses with a hearing 
officer's decision in the interest of an expedited determination by this Board. 
1 
The relevant facts are: 
1. Since 1969 "negotiations regarding the health insurance 
program for County employees has related solely to payment 
of premiums." 
2. The parties entered into an agreement on February 27, 1976 which 
runs through December 31, 1977. Article XIX, Section 4 of that 
1 Quotations are from the stipulation of the parties. 4779 
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agreement provides a salary reopener for the calendar year 1977. 
3. "On October 13, 1976 the County advised the CSEA of the 
proposed change in the health insurance plan to be effective 
as of December 1, 1976....CSEA requested negotiations regarding 
the proposed change in the health insurance programs. The 
County responded that a change in health insurance programs 
was a management prerogative and covered by Section IV of the 
1976-77 Contract (Joint Exhibit 1). Thereafter, the County 
Legislature adopted a resolution changing the health insurance 
program effective December 1. The change was to substitute a 
group health insurance program for a New York State Governmental 
Employees Health Insurance Plan." 
DISCUSSION 
The charging party has submitted no brief in support of its position. 
The County submitted a brief which states its position that past negotiations 
concerning health insurance were restricted to the kirids of benefit coverage 
and left to the employer the designation of the insurance carrier. According 
to the County, it was not obligated, in any event, to negotiate over a demand 
regarding the choice of insurance carrier during the life of a contract that 
provided for a reopening only on salary. Finally, it alleges that the Group 
Health Insurance program that it selected provides even greater benefits than 
the New York State Government Employees Insurance Plan that it dropped, and 
it attempts to document this allegation. 
The sole issue is one of contract interpretation. The parties have 
negotiated and continue to be bound by an agreement which, among other things, 
covers the subject of health insurance. Whether that agreement reserved to 
the County, as it contends, the right to designate the insurance carrier, or 
whether it did not, as the CSEA contends, is a question that should be resolved 
through the grievance mechanism that the parties have set up to interpret their 
contract. It is not the responsibility of this Board to do so in these circum-
stances. Accordingly, we dismiss the charge. In reaching this conclusion, 
we are persuaded by the dissenting opinion in the decision in Matter of the 
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Town of Orangetown, 8 PERB 1f3042 (1975) at page 3072. The dissent states: 
"I do not find that this Board has been granted broad 
jurisdiction to interpret a collective agreement. Admittedly 
there may be occasions when it is necessary for this Board to 
interpret provisions of an agreement, but to the limited 
extent of determining whether there has been a statutory 
violation, for example, to determine whether an.employee 
organization has waived its right to negotiate on a particular 
subj ect so as to permit unilateral action by an employer—.... 
[I]n a situation where the employer refuses to implement 
an express provision in the contract, or does so in a manner 
which the employee organization feels is not in accordance 
with the provision in the contract, what would be involved is 
a pure contractual question and the enforcement of the contract 
as such, and thus outside the jurisdiction of this Board. In 
brief, when an employer's obligation to act or not to act is 
wholly contractual, the enforcement of such obligation should 
be dealt with either by arbitration (if the parties had so 
agreed) or by a.plenary action. 
-3 
3 Cf NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 335 U.,S. 421." 
This Board now adopts the dissenting opinion in the Orangetown case. We do not 
find that this is one of the "occasions when it is necessary for this Board" 
to interpret the provision in question. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the decision herein is hereby dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
June 30, 1977 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
3A*. £L >JJA*£— • 
Ida Klaus 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF YONKERS, 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Respondent. 
-and-
[JNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE 
PAID FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF YONKERS, 
Charging Party. 
#2B~6/30/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2074 
This matter comes to us on exceptions of both the Uniformed Fire 
Officers Association of the Paid Fire Department of the City of Yonkers 
(charging party herein) and the City of Yonkers (respondent herein) to a 
decision of a hearing officer. That decision found merit in some of the 
charges made by the charging party and dismissed'others. The charge alleged 
that respondent violated §2Q9-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act)- in that it acted unilaterally in each of the 
following five respects, herein referred to as separate parts of the basic 
charge: 
1. restructured fire officer 1976 vacation schedules so as to 
reduce by nearly 55% the number of officers eligible to 
take their vacations during the prime summer vacation periods; 
2,., discontinued the practice of paying time-and-one-half to officers 
required to work overtime in order to replace members of the 
association's executive board released for association business; 
1 These sections of the Act provide that "...it shall be an improper practice 
for a public employer or its agents deliberately (a) to interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce public employees in the exercise of their rights 
guaranteed in section two hundred and two for the purpose of depriving them 
of such rights;...(c) to discriminate against any employee for the purpose 
of encouraging or discouraging membership in, or participation in the 
activities of, any employee organization; or (d) to refuse to negotiate in 
good faith with the duly recognized or certified representatives of its 
public employees." 
782 
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discontinued the practice of releasing the association's 
vice president to replace its president when the latter 
takes his vacation, and paying time-and-one-half to 
officers called in to replace the vice president so released: 
terminated the payment of five hours overtime to the officer 
assigned by the association to carry out its contractual 
responsibility for calling in officers for "extra-duty 
assignments" in accordance with an equitable schedule 
designed by the association; 
terminated replacement at time-and-one-half of the officer 
in charge of respondent's communication division when that 
officer is released for association business. 
The hearing officer determined that the evidence did not sustain a 
violation of either §209-a.l(a) or (c) with respect to any of the five parts o:: 
the charge because respondent's action was not intended to deprive public 
employees of rights guaranteed by §202 of the Act or to encourage or discourage 
membership in or participation in the activities of any employee organization. 
He dismissed Part 1; sustained Part 2; dismissed some aspects of Part 3 and 
sustained others; sustained Part 4; and dismissed Part 5. 
After the hearing officer issued his decision and recommended order, 
charging party made a motion to reopen the record with respect to that aspect 
of Part 3 of the charge that was dismissed so that it could introduce additional 
evidence. We denied the motion, saying (at 10'PEKB 1[3020, p. 3043 [1977]), 
"Charging party had an opportunity to seek to introduce 
evidence that was in its possession before the hearing was 
closed, but it did not attempt to do so." 
Thereafter, the parties submitted briefs in support of their respective 
positions and reply briefs in response to each other's exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments of the 
parties, we affirm the determinations of the hearing officer, though we do 
not adopt the basis in one instance, as pointed out below. 
4. 
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FACTS 
All five parts of this charge deal with changes in past practice 
with respect to. unit employees that were made by respondent unilaterally. 
They relate either to vacation time or to the payment of overtime in 
circumstances not specifically covered in the parties' collectively 
negotiated agreement in effect-at the time. These changes were made .. . ._. . . 
as part of an effort to reduce respondent's expenses in the face of a 
2 financial emergency.— The charging party contends that respondent's 
refusal to continue the extra-contractual benefits constituted a unilateral 
change in terms and conditions of iemployment which could only be achieved 
through joint negotiations required by the Act. The primary defense of 
respondent is that all the changes related to non-mandatory subjects of 
negotiation and that, therefore, it was under no duty to negotiate with 
charging party regarding them. Its secondary defense is that its actions were 
justified by the financial emergency. 
DISCUSSION 
The financial emergency does not excuse respondent from its duty to 
negotiate. This is stated explicitly in §2-a, subd. 3, of the Yonkers 
Financial Emergency Act. That statute imposes restrictions upon the obligations 
that respondent may incur in the future (see §7, subd. l.e), but it does 
not relieve it of any current financial obligations. 
The defense that this charge deals with non-mandatory subjects of 
negotiation must be evaluated with respect to each part of the charge. 
1_ That financial emergency has been recognized by the State Legislature. 
Section 2-a of Chapter 871 of the Laws of 1975, entitled, The New York 
State Financial Emergency Act of the City of Yonkers provides: 
"The legislature hereby finds and declares that a state of 
financial emergency exists within the city of Yonkers." 
4784 
Board - U-2074 -4 
Part 1 (Vacation Time) 
The calendar year is divided into eighteen periods during which 
vacations are to be taken. Both before and after January 1, 1976, unit 
employees could select their vacation periods on a seniority basis. 
Before 1976 a disproportionately large number of employees were permitted 
to select vacations to be taken during the most desirable summer months. For 
1976, however, respondent required that an equal number of unit employees take 
vacation during each of the eighteen vacation periods. This has reduced sub-
stantially the number of unit employees who can be on vacation during the prime 
vacation periods; it has also reduced the number of extra-duty assignments 
of other employees that were formerly required to assure a full complement 
of unit employees during the prime vacation period. 
We determine that the change in the number of fire officers who 
may take a vacation at any one time was not a violation of respondent's 
duty to negotiate. The situation here is similar to one considered by us 
in Matter of City of White Plains, 5 PERB 1[3008 (1972). In that case, we 
determined that (at page 3015): 
"It is the City alone which must determine the number of 
firemen it must have on duty at any given time. It cannot 
be compelled to negotiate with respect to this matter.... 
Within the framework which the City may impose unilaterally 
that a specified number of Fire Fighters must be on duty at 
specified times, the City is obligated to negotiate over the 
tours of duty of the Fire Fighters within its employ." 
Applying that reasoning to the instant situation, respondent may determine 
the number of unit employees that it must have on duty during each of the 
vacation periods. Within that framework, it is obligated to negotiate over 
the order in which vacation preferences may be granted. Those vacation 
preferences had been and continued to be determined on the basis of seniority. 
4e1 bO 
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Thus, there was no improper unilateral determination of a negotiable 
v * 3 subject.— 
Part 2 (Replacements' Payment Rate) 
This part of the charge is not concerned with manning levels or with 
whether unit employees should be called in to replace members of charging 
party's executive board who are released for association business. Its sole 
concern is compensation to be paid to employees who are called in. Compen-
sation, including premium pay for special assignments, is a mandatory subject 
of negotiation, and a unilateral change by a public employer of a past 
practice of granting such premium pay is a violation of its duty to negotiate. 
Part 3 (Replacement of President) 
The first aspect of this part of the charge is that charging party's 
vice president was denied time off to engage in association business when 
charging party's president was on vacation. On July 24, 1975, charging party 
was advised that respondent would not continue the practice of giving the vice 
president such time off "next year". According to the charging party, this 
new policy became operative on January 1, 1976, the start of the "next year". 
The record contains no evidence that charging party's vice president ever 
sought or was denied time off to replace the president when the latter was on 
vacation; thus, the only event contained in the record that might be the 
basis of a charge occurred on July 24, 1975, when the respondent announced its 
_3 The hearing officer made the same determination that we do, but for 
different reasons. He determined that the agreement then in force gave 
respondent a contractual right to change vacation periods in the case of 
financial emergency. Having resolved that part of the charge in favor 
of respondent on other grounds, we do not reach the question of contract 
interpretation. 
4786 
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intention to change the policy. No act of any significance occurred on 
January 1, 1976, or between then and April 1, 1976. The hearing officer 
determined that the charge was not timely. We agree. 
The second aspect of this part of the charge is that when charging 
party's vice president was granted time off during the closing weeks of 1975 
to replace its president, the unit employees who were assigned to replace the 
vice president were not paid at time-and-a-half, contrary to past practice. 
As we have already said in our discussion of Part 2 of the charge, the 
rate at which an employee is paid is a term and condition of employment, and 
a public employer may not alter a practice of paying at time-and-a-half without 
prior negotiation pursuant to §209 of the Act. 
Part 4 (Payment for "Extra Duty" Calls) 
Respondent contends that it is under no obligation to pay the 
officer appointed by charging party to call in unit employees on "extra-duty" 
assignments. Its reason is that the contract assigns to charging party the 
responsibility for allocating "extra-duty" assignments among unit employees 
and that the officer who makes these assignments is merely carrying out an 
assignment made by charging party. 
The hearing officer correctly determined that the collective 
agreement provides for charging party to perform a function on behalf of 
respondent in designating unit employees who should be called in for "extra-
duty" assignments. Thus, he concluded that payments to the officer appointed 
by the association to make such assignments was "compensation for work 
performed on behalf of the respondent". We agree with the hearing officer 
that compensation for this assignment was a term and condition of that extra 
work on behalf of respondent. 
4787 
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Part 5 (Replacement of Communications Officer) 
Whether or not respondent requires the services of a communications 
officer is within its prerogative as management to determine. (Matter of 
City School District of the City of New' Rochelle, 4 PERB 1[3060, and Matter 
of City of White Plains, supra). Respondent violated no duty when it 
determined unilaterally that it would not replace the communications officer 
while he was engaged in association business. Charging party argues, however, 
that because the communications officer was interrupted several times while 
attending association meetings to take telephone calls regarding problems 
in the communications division, respondent interfered with his contractual right's 
of participation in association affairs. The hearing officer rejected this 
argument, saying that the interruptions were de minimus and that they did not 
amount to a unilateral change in the negotiated terms and conditions of 
employment. Charging party contends that no violation of its right can be 
viewed as de minimus. It says that it must be free to charge a violation, 
even for a minor infraction, because if it waits for the improper conduct to 
become more serious, it may find that its time to file a charge has passed. 
We agree that even a minor infraction will support an improper practice charge; 
however, we do not agree that an occasional phone call to an employee who is 
at home on time off,or away on vacation, or attending an association meeting 
constitutes an improper interference with that employee's right to enjoy or 
properly utilize his time off. 
NOW, THEREFORE, respondent is ordered to negotiate in good faith 
with respect to: 
1. Its discontinuance of the practice of paying time-and-qne-half 
to officers required to work overtime in order to replace members on 
charging party's executive board released for association business. 
2. Its discontinuance of the practice of paying time-and-on.@!isBa^ #> to 
officers called in to replace charging party's vice president when 
Board - U-2074 -8 
he is released to replace its president. 
3. Its termination of payment of five hours overtime to the officer 
assigned by charging party to carry out its contractual responsibility 
for calling in officers for "extra-duty assignments" in accordance 
with an equitable schedule designed by charging party; 
All other parts of the charge are dismissed. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
June 30, 1977 
C?V^- /£x-€LA^£_ 
IDA KLAUS 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
YONKERS BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
Respondent, 
#2C-6/30/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE No. U-2364 
- and -
YONKERS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Charging Party. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Yonkers Federation 
of Teachers, charging party herein, from the decision of the hearing officer 
dismissing its charge. That charge alleges that the Board of Education of the 
City of Yonkers, respondent herein, committed an improper practice in violation 
of §§209-a.l(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act).— Specifically, the charge alleges that Mr. John Romano and other mem-
bers of the board vilified the charging party and, more particularly, its 
president, Walter Tice, for implementing the current collectively negotiated 
agreement and exerted pressure on them to relinquish benefits specified in that 
agreement. 
The hearing officer found that Mr. Romano had subjected Mr. Tice to 
verbal abuse at several of respondent's public meetings held between June 29, 
1 These sections of the Taylor Law provide that "...it shall be an improper 
practice for a public employer or its agents deliberately (a) to interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce public employees in the exercise of their rights 
guaranteed in section two hundred and two for the purpose of depriving 
them of such rights; (b) to dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of any employee organization for the purpose of depriving then 
of such rights; (c) to discriminate against any employee for the purpose 
of encouraging or discouraging membership in, or participation in the 
activities of, any employee organization; or (d) to refuse to negotiate in 
good faith with the duly recognized or certified representatives of its 
public employees." 
Board - U-2364 -2 
2 
1976 and January 13, 1977• The City of Yonkers was then facing a financial emer' 
3 
gency and respondent, which receives its funds from the City of Yonkers, was 
seeking relief from obligations imposed by its collective agreement with the 
charging party. 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge. He determined that there 
was no basis for it with respect to §209-a.l(a) because charging party "failed 
to sustain its burden of proof that they [the statements] were made for the 
purpose of depriving Tice or any employee of his rights guaranteed in §202, a 
necessary element to establish a violation of §209-a.1(a)". He rejected so 
much of the charge as alleged a violation of §209-a.l(b) because he found 
"nothing in the record to suggest that Romano's statements had the effect of 
improperly influencing or dominating the YFT [charging party]." He dismissed 
the charge insofar as it alleged a violation of §209-a.l(c), finding that 
2_ Among the statements made by Mr. Romano were that there was hostility between 
charging party and the people of Yonkers because of charging party's 
refusal to help in the financial crisis and that the charging party did not 
represent the teachers in Yonkers. He stated that "the union had the city 
in chains" and asked, "Why don't the teachers roll back their salaries and 
save the city?" He also said that "he had talked to some teachers and 
that he didn't really believe that the union represented the teachers in 
Yonkers". He misstated Mr. Tice's name as "mice, lice or whatever it is", 
and complained that Mr. Tice worked only two periods a day under the released 
time provisions of the agreement. This was a misstatement of facts; the 
agreement required Mr. Tice to work three periods per day. Other comments 
included, "Teachers managed to increase their pensions by $1.5 million... 
they took care of themselves and not the kids", and "Mr. Tice, you are an 
insult to Yonkers." At the meeting on January 13, 1977, Mr. Romano made it 
clear that his criticism of Mr. Tice was directed at his role as a union 
leader and not as a teacher or an individual. 
_3 That financial emergency has been recognized by the State Legislature. 
Section 2-a of Chapter 871 of the Laws of 1975, entitled, The New York State 
Financial Emergency Act of the City of Yonkers provides: "The legislature 
hereby finds and declares that a state of financial emergency exists within 
the City of Yonkers." 
4791 
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"there is no proof of any act of discrimination against Tice or any other 
employee for the purpose of discouraging membership or participation in the 
activities of YFT [charging party]." With respect to the allegation that 
respondent refused to negotiate in good faith in violation of §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act, he determined that the only circumstance at issue was whether 
respondent has unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of employment by 
denying Mr. Tice an opportunity to make comments at board meetings as he was 
permitted to do pursuant to the agreement. On this matter, he found that Mr. 
Tice's opportunities to make comments were not restricted unduly, saying: 
"When he was cut off, it was merely a natural consequence of a turbulent 
meeting at which the chairman was attempting to restore order." 
Charging party submitted a brief and presented oral argument in 
support of its exceptions. Respondent submitted no brief and did not 
participate in the oral argument. 
We affirm the hearing officer' s decision>5which is supported by the 
record. However, the issues raised by those parts of the charge that allege 
a violation of §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Taylor Law raise a more complicated 
question of law. The question is whether Mr. Romano's statements constituted 
an interference by the public employer with the rights guaranteed by the 
Taylor Law. ' 
While we find Mr. Romano's statements to be questionable^ they do 
not constitute a violation of §.209-a.l by the board as the public employer. 
In any event, the making of those statements was not conducive to harmonious 
labor relations between respondent and the charging party and did violence 
to the public policy specified in §200 of the Taylor Law. 
4792 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
June 30, 1977 
T&5BERT ID"'.' HElTSBY, Chairman 
n 
JOSEPH R. CROWLEY. 
cM^ /CjLajQ^-^' 
IDA KLAUS 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
'X 
'' __ //2D-6/30/77 
In the Matter of 
FRONTIER CENTRAL SCHOOLS, : 
Employer, : 
- and -
FRONTIER SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, fZ CASE NO. C-1476 
\ 
Petitioner. \ 
BOARD DECISION 
On February 24, 1917, the Frontier Service Employees 
Association:(petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition 
' ) . • - ' • - -
J 
for certification as the exclusive negotiating representative of certain. 
employees employed by the Frontier Central School District. 
The parties executed a consent agreement which was approved 
by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation on 
May 20, 1977. The negotiating unit stipulated to therein was as follows: 
INCLUDED: All non-instructional employees. 
EXCLUDED: Supervisor of Buildings & Grounds,Supervisor 
of Transportation, District Clerk/Supervising 
Clerk, Assistant Supervising Clerk, Head 
Custodian, Head Bus Driver, Head Maintenanceman, 
Head Groundsman, Auto Mechanic Foreman, School 
Lunch Manager, District Treasurer, Secretary to 
the Superintendent, Secretary to the Assistant 
Superintendent. 
4784 
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Pursuant to the consent agreement., a secret ballot election 
was held on June 9, 1977. The results of this election indicate that the 
majority of eligible voters in the stipulated unit who cast valid ballots 
do not desire to be represented for purposes of collective negotiations by 
the petitioner. — 
Dated: Albany, New York 
This 30th day of June, 1977 
C7?Ls^_ /&dUu 
IDA KLAUS 
1/ There were 103 ballots cast in favor of representation by the 
petitioner and 162 ballots against representation by the petitioner. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS DO.- -,D 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF AMSTERDAM, 
- and. - Employer, 
AMSTERDAM POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOC-
IATION, INC., . 
. Petitioner, 
- and -
TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL 294, 
Intervenor. 
#2E-6/30/77 
CASE NO. C-1369 
?
 " CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE" AMD ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED.that the Teamsters Union, Local 294 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the'purpose of collective 
negotiations and the .settlement of grievances. 
lUnits INCLUDED: All firefighters within the Public Safety 
Department. 
EXCLUDED: The chiefs and deputy chiefs. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Union, Local 294 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
ifith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and'shall 
negotiate collectively with sit en. employee organization in.thc-
Jeterraination of, and 'administration of, grievances. 
>'igned on the 30th day of June - 3.9 77 
(/afj&isff. (J£BW)(&/ JUI& 
J/osesph R. Crowley / 4796 
Ida Klaus 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BG....D 
In the Matter of 
VOORHEESVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
UNITED EMPLOYEES OF VOOKHEESVILLE 
UNION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
#2F-6/30/77 
CASE NO.- C-1498 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that'a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Employees of 
Voorheesville Union, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: INCLUDED: All full time and regular part time classified 
employees including.automobile mechanics, building main-
tenance helpers, bus drivers, bus drivers-custodial workers, 
cook-manager,, custodians, custodian workers, food services 
helpers, groundsmen, head custodians, clerks', senior clerks, 
principal clerks, school monitors, school- nurses, senior 
automobile mechanics, senior-account clerk; stenographer, 
senior'stenographers,senior typists, teacher-aides, typists, 
watchmen. 
EXCLUDED: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectivelv with the United Employees of 
Voorheesville Union, NYSUT,"AFT, AFL-CIO 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
.•7ith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 30th day of June 1977 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
•(jml ft. tfL&& U-Joseph R. Crowley 
47!i7 
Ida Klaus 
